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Dream Capitalism 
Chris Pierson (University of Nottingham) 
In Free Market Fairness, John Tomasi shows himself to be a man with both a map and a mission.  
The map shows a frozen sea with advocates of classical liberalism and contemporary 
libertarianism camped on one coast and (post-Rawlsian) ‘high liberals’ on the other.  The two 
camps are within sight, but beyond the hearing, of each other and each group goes about its 
routine business, aware of but little interested in what happens on the other side of the 
intervening wasteland.  Map in hand, Captain Tomasi’s mission is to force his ice-breaker S.S. 
Market Democracy between the two camps (drawing in supporters as he may) with his compass 
set firmly upon reaching the higher moral ground of free market fairness that lies somewhere 
beyond; (even if it is a challenge to imagine an icebreaker occupying the high ground!).  (Tomasi, 
2012, 99-100).1 
    
Tomasi finds himself drawn to what is good in both camps – and resistant to that which he sees 
as ‘bad’ -  and he believes that these various strengths can be combined to provide us with an 
account of justice (in the case of the ‘high’ liberals, ‘social’ justice) which is superior to that 
offered by either of the contemporary orthodoxies.   This is not to be achieved, however, by 
simply ‘splitting the difference’ between the two.   Rather, Tomasi argues that we can and should 
(at least for now) pursue the account of social justice laid down in its essentials by John Rawls, 
but with this one crucial change – that the ‘economic liberties’ which Rawls excludes from his 
framework of basic liberties should be included on that list and be appropriately prioritised and 
protected.    
 
Since I don’t regard myself as either a Rawlsian or a libertarian – or indeed, in any very real 
sense, an endorser of the classical liberals – I am inclined to think that this may just be someone 
else’s fight.   And I am tempted to hold their coats and watch the fur fly.   But I do have a good 
deal of sympathy with Rawls’s view that a good society  – here in the variant of his formulation 
favoured by Tomasi -  is ‘a fair system of cooperation among citizens committed to respecting 
one another as responsible self-authors’ (88).  And even if I don’t agree with the way in which 
                                                             
1 All subsequent page numbers refer to Tomasi, 2012 unless indicated otherwise. 
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both he and Tomasi got here, I do think it’s worth defending Rawls against Tomasi’s 
hybridization which, to anticipate just a little, I think is wrong.    
 
There’s plenty of substance to engage with in Tomasi’s engaging book.  Here I focus on just one 
aspect, but this probably the most crucial: that is the core claim that the Rawlsian framework of 
basic liberties needs to be completed by including a series of ‘economic liberties’.   We should 
begin by looking at the context of this claim.  Those whom Tomasi labels the ‘classic liberals’ 
(Locke, Hume, Smith and, closer to our own time, Hayek) all recognised the centrality of private 
property (including productive private property) in securing a society that was dynamic, capable 
of economic growth and whose citizens were free; (for example, Locke, 1988[1689], 268-302, 
Hume, 2000[1739-40], 314-31, Smith, 1978 [1762-3], 16-32, 208, 459-60).  But none of the 
classical liberals (including Hayek) saw these rights as ‘absolute’.  Taxation, even progressive 
taxation (within limits) was legitimate.  Society has a duty to provide for those of its members 
who cannot provide for themselves and perhaps to support (publicly-funded) education (Hayek, 
1973, 109, 121).  This account was not always very coherent, Tomasi suggests, but it was fairly 
ubiquitous (4-11, 16-26).  By contrast, libertarians tend to see the claims of property as ‘absolute’ 
and often grounded in some account of our ‘self-ownership’.   Indeed, rather than seeing 
property rights as balanced by other basic liberties, libertarians have a tendency to see all rights as 
(basically) the property rights of self-owning individuals (see, for example, Narveson, 1988, 66).  
Tomasi (87-122) rejects this ‘absolutist’ view in favour of something much closer to ‘classical 
liberalism’ – and it is this which draws him away from the libertarian camp (despite the many 
friends he has had to leave behind there). 
 
Tomasi grounds his own account of market democracy and free market fairness within a 
justificatory apparatus that is self-consciously Rawlsian.  Having endorsed the judgement that 
society should be understood as a system of fair cooperation, he supports the idea that we must 
first establish those basic rights which have to be secured in such a society.  This is the first (and 
lexically prior) of Rawls’s two principles of justice: 
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal 
basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all  
(Rawls, 2001, 42) 
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It is here that the breach with Rawls and all those ‘high’ liberals who have followed him down 
this path occurs.   Rawls defines the basic liberties as these: the political liberty to vote and run 
for office, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of personal property 
and freedom from arbitrary arrest (Rawls, 1991, 53).  What is included in the ‘freedom of 
personal property’ is not fully developed (though it would include some forms of real property, 
certainly  homes and gardens), but Rawls does explicitly exclude the following: 
(i) The right to private property in natural resources and means of production 
generally, including rights of acquisition and bequest; 
(Rawls, 2001, 114) 
It is this qualification that Tomasi rejects.  Indeed, Tomasi accuses all the ‘high’ liberals (in a 
lineage which he retraces to J.S. Mill) of practising a form of ‘economic exceptionalism’ – 
excluding ‘economic’ liberties from the status and protection that is afforded to the more 
recognisably ‘political’ liberties, including rights in our personal property (42/3).  In doing so, he 
does not proceed from the bases most familiar in both ‘classical liberal’ and libertarian accounts 
(prominent among them, self-ownership and the natural law).  Rather, he argues that a much 
more extensive (though not unlimited) basic right to private property is justified on the same 
basis as Rawls’s other basic liberties:  that is, that it is indispensable to securing the two moral 
powers – a sense of justice and a conception of the good – which Rawls has insisted are the sine 
qua non of a just political order: ‘to exercise our powers in these ways is essential to us as free and 
equal citizens’ (Rawls, 2001, 18-19, 45).  ‘Economic liberties’, or as he calls them when he gets 
the bit between his teeth’, ‘capitalist economic liberties’ should be among the basic liberties 
protected in any reasonable scheme of social justice.   
 
Here we need to attend to a little more of the detail in Tomasi’s account.   His core claim is this: 
‘the same reasons high liberals offer in support of their preferred economic liberties apply with at 
least as much force to the aspects of economic freedom they wish to exclude’ (76).  So, Tomasi 
insists, if you allow a right to free occupational choice (as Rawls does), you must, by the same 
reasoning, allow ‘freedom to sell, trade and donate one’s labor’ and this includes a (more or less) 
unregulated right to negotiate terms and conditions of employment.   Similarly, if you allow (as 
‘high’ liberals do) a right to the ownership of personal (non-productive) property, you must allow 
a much more extensive right to own productive property.  Here, Tomasi’s argument is that the 
same things that personal property gives us (in terms of security and identity) are also given by 
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productive property (for example, the stocks and shares that will provide us with a pension).  
More than this, taking certain financial decisions (spend now or invest?) is a way for citizens to 
exercise the ‘moral capacities they have as self-authors’ (90).    Upon this account, ‘a thick 
conception of economic liberty is a necessary condition of responsible self-authorship’ and hence 
morally required (98; emphasis added).   
 
It is important to see just how far ‘bringing economic liberty back in’ will take us.  According to 
Tomasi, governments should confine their regulation of the workplace and incomes to 
preventing clearly hazardous production processes.  Individuals should be free to negotiate 
labour contracts with employers; and conversely employers should be free to negotiate terms and 
conditions with employees as individuals.  Anti-discrimination legislation should not generally 
apply within the private sector (where employers should feel free to discriminate on grounds of 
gender or race, for example) (241).  Governments should provide a social safety net for the 
indigent - but not its own education or health services. These should be delivered in a lightly-
regulated private sector, with the possibility of a voucher system for those who lack the 
resources to buy within these markets.2  The extent of the inequality of incomes (even if 
profoundly unequal) is not a matter of legitimate concern and it is not a legitimate ambition of 
taxation to redistribute wealth.  Market democracy is generally hostile to taxation of the 
transmission of resources within families across generations (256).   
 
There is very much more in Tomasi’s account  - but this is, I hope, enough to give a sense of his 
hybrid order.   In what follows, I want to focus upon an evaluation of his core claim which is 
that ‘capitalist economic liberties’ should be regarded as Rawlsian basic liberties - and therefore 
subject to special protection, not least a veto upon anything that might follow from the second 
principle of justice (fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle). 
 
 
                                                             
2 Market democratic regimes will have, so Tomasi supposes, a commitment to secure for every 
citizen ‘high quality health care and education as a matter of justice’.  But as this is a part of the 
rubric of fair equality of opportunity (FEO) and hence of the second principle of justice, it is 
subordinate to securing the basic rights of the first schedule, including the capitalist economic 
liberties (241-2).    
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Back to Rawls 
 
It will perhaps make sense to begin such an evaluation with Rawls himself.  Why did he exclude 
the right to own productive capital from his list of basic rights?  In fact, (in a passage Tomasi 
cites) Rawls’s response in A Theory of Justice is pretty brief: ‘the right to own certain kinds of 
property (e.g., means of production) and freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of 
laissez-faire are not basic; and so they are not protected by the priority of the first principle’  
(Rawls, 1999, 54).    In A Theory of Justice especially, Rawls is non-committal about whether a 
capitalist or socialist economic regime is to be preferred; this is a matter of historical contingency 
and not within the purview of the first principle of justice (1973, 258).  However, in Justice as 
Fairness he does return to a survey of five kinds of regime:  laissez-faire capitalism, welfare state-
capitalism, state socialism with a command economy, property-owning democracy and liberal 
(democratic) socialism (Rawls, 2001, 136-).  Here he judges that only two regimes - a property-
owning democracy and liberal socialism - can fully satisfy the requirement of the two principles 
of justice.  Of what he regards as the more benign of the two capitalist regimes (welfare-state 
capitalism), he writes ‘it permits very large inequalities in the ownership of real property 
(productive assets and natural resources) so that the control of the economy and much of political 
life rests in few hands’ (Rawls, 2001, 136-8; emphasis added).   We know that Rawls is not hostile 
to property per se - clearly not, given that personal property is protected in his own list of basic 
liberties.  But it also appears that he is not opposed to all forms of productive private property (as 
these would function in a property-owning democracy).  He is hostile to large concentrations of 
wealth and to transmissions of this wealth between generations – and this, above all, because it 
will undermine ‘the fair value of equal liberties’ (Rawls, 2001, 137-8; see also O’Neill and 
Williamson, 2012; Freeman, 2013) 
 
Given this, it is strange that Tomasi does not devote more space to Rawls’s reasons for 
endorsing a property-owning democracy; (it’s discussed briefly at 114 and again at 222). Where 
he does discuss it this is largely to dismiss it as a state-heavy, tax-driven dirigiste regime – with 
nationalized health care and state funding of political parties.  He suggests that this would 
‘concentrate economic decision making power in the hands of deliberative political bodies’ (114); 
(it’s not entirely clear if this means legislative assemblies or worker-managed cooperative 
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enterprises).   Elsewhere, he suggests that, in a Rawls-inspired economy, workers will find 
themselves in endless workplace meetings discussing how their business should be run - instead 
of making more (money) or sitting at home watching a ball game (188-92).  In fact, there is much 
more to the market socialist tradition than Tomasi’s rather cursory footnote suggests and many 
of its (somewhat idealised) forms have a quite limited role for the central state and varying forms 
of management, workplace representation and so on; (on which, see, for example, Miller 1989, 
Pierson, 1995).  
 
One of the things which Tomasi does not discuss in any detail is that which is surely the most 
important element in Rawls’s argument against basic ‘economic’ liberties – and one which is 
remarkably simple.  In Rawls’s view, granting the extensive protection that being a basic right 
affords to the right to own and deploy productive capital will lead to an (unfair) concentration of 
economic power and, with it, an (illegitimate) concentration of effective political power.    In a 
series of rather droll metaphors drawn from the board game Monopoly, Tomasi seems to 
acknowledge this challenge (33-4).   Contrasting ‘Classical Liberal Monopoly’ to a more primitive 
forerunner (so-called ‘Feudal Monopoly’!), he recognises that ‘new liberals’ or ‘high liberals’ 
object to the former on the grounds that applying the same rules to everyone irrespective of their 
initial stake is unfair.  (More than this, the point is that even a quite minor starting-point 
disequilibrium  - which could arise from faultlessly landing on one of life’s ‘penalty’ squares – will 
tend to be self-reinforcing across time).  And he seems to back this ‘new liberal’ judgement.  
Indeed, it is one of the reasons that he insists Tomasian liberals ought to reject the classical 
grounds of classical liberalism (and, still more so, libertarianism) in favour of a principled account 
of the just society à la Rawls.  But, of course, the substantive content of the basic rights that 
Tomasi seeks to build into his revised framework for social justice is a much fuller set of rights 
to own and deploy productive private property.  The case against this was made rather neatly 
some thirty years ago by Robert Dahl (1985, 75); ‘We cannot leap from my entitlement to secure 
possession of the shirt on my back or the cash in my pocket to a fundamental moral right to 
acquire shares in IBM’. 
 
Here we might want to think about playing Monopoly ‘in the real world’.  As most people will 
know, Monopoly was originally developed not by a smart game-design entrepreneur but by 
Lizzie Magie, a follower of the radical property critic Henry George.  The game was designed to 
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show how a series of ‘free and equal exchanges’ between economic actors with unequal initial 
bundles of resources would tend to concentrate resources and power in the hands of an ever 
smaller elite.3  The wider point - which I think is probably Rawls’s position - is that the free-play 
of capitalist economic liberties as basic will lead not to Jeffersonian, or even Jacksonian, 
democracy but to plutocracy.   
 
The American Dream and American Capitalism 
 
At this point, with some trepidation (and after a short but significant detour), I think we have 
little alternative but to get out our maps and set off on a voyage of discovery to the ‘real world’.   
Of course, there are some who will refuse to embark on this journey from ‘political philosophy’ 
to ‘political theory’ (to use Tomasi’s own descriptors) – but he is not one of them (119-120).  In 
fact, Tomasi writes about the tricky relationship between ‘ideal systems’ and the ‘real world’ with 
a good deal of common sense and a lightness of touch.  He points out that it is both unfair (and 
common practice) to subject the recommendations of one’s opponents to withering criticism in 
terms of their feasibility in the ‘real world’,  while protecting one’s own preferred options as ideal 
models for which such a test is inappropriate (207-15).   And he resists the temptation to short-
circuit the debate by pointing out (as I would see it, quite fairly) that no-one can show us a 
scaled-up working model of Rawls’s preferred regimes anywhere nor, indeed, identify any serious 
prospect of such a regime commanding the political support that would get it into play.   If 
anything, the traffic is all moving in the opposite direction.  In this generous spirit, Tomasi’s 
contrast between his own and the Rawlsian version of the two principles in Chapters 7 and 8 is 
conducted in the realm of ideal theory, ‘bracketing out’ the ‘elephant in the room’ which is that 
no-one thinks Rawls’s preferred scheme has a cat-in-hell’s chance of being instantiated in the 
‘real world’.   
 
So it would be quite wrong to criticise Tomasi for setting up the terms of debate in such a way 
that his own solution will be favoured.  And if we choose to criticise Tomasi’s schema in terms 
of its ‘real world’ implications, it is only right to say that at the outset that, in these terms, Rawls’s 
                                                             
3  Even with Magie’s rather unworldly equal pay regime under which every player passing go 
collects $200 in ‘wages’! 
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preferences look politically pretty hopeless.  Having said all of which, I don’t think we can simply 
abstract Tomasi’s argument from the ‘real world’.   After all, it is presented to us, in significant 
part, as a vindication of American capitalism.  It is, in his own terms, a work of political theory 
rather than (just!) a work of political philosophy.   Indeed, it is in part an appeal to restore the 
regime which existed before the New Deal – that is, at a time before the emergence of America’s 
own half-baked welfare state.   Free Market Fairness begins and ends with a celebration of the 
dynamism and vibrancy of both American society and the American economy – which Tomasi 
says he likes! (xii-xiii, 272)  He argues (with some reason, I think) that ‘real people’, as opposed 
to ideal citizens, don’t want to cashier the rich and famous – they want to join them! (62-3).   
 
But I also think that the classical liberal tradition (within which Tomasi places himself) has a 
‘special relationship’ to the ‘real world’.  I want to suggest that, for the classical liberal argument 
to be secure, especially in the form in which Tomasi has presented it, the regime has really got to 
‘work’.   Of course, one could argue that the ‘economic liberties’ are important because they 
increase the range of opportunities for individuals to exercise ‘moral self-authorship’  - and that 
this would be true, and that they would be valuable, even if the economic out-turn was 
catastrophic.  But I don’t think this is Tomasi’s position.  And, for reasons I’ll identify, I think it 
can’t really be the classical liberal position.  Of course, Tomasi recognises (and celebrates) the 
tremendous increase in economic productivity that the unleashing of economic liberties 
generates.  But this is really crucial to the classical liberal position, because in the end it is this 
(perhaps, it is only this) which justifies the actual allocation of private property holdings; (another 
question which Tomasi does not discuss).   
At a strategic point in the book – at the start of Chapter 3, where Tomasi invites us to ‘think the 
unthinkable’ - he makes great play of the fantastic productivity of the American economy.  
Although a significant part of his argument here is that as people become more affluent they do 
not lose their interest in material goods (contra Mills and Keynes, as Tomasi sees it), prior to this 
there is a celebration of the enormous economic growth achieved by twentieth-century American 
capitalism.  Of course, Tomasi is not the first to notice this dynamic tendency in capitalism.  It is 
a phenomenon reported in extravagant terms in the first part of the Commmunist Manifesto, for 
example, and in Schumpeter’s (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Schumpeter, 1976).  But, 
for Tomasi, here following Deirdre McCloskey (2010), it is the ‘Great Fact’.  And I think it really 
is important because, if it is to do the work required of it, the classical liberal argument (at least as 
Tomasi defends it) is profoundly consequentialist.   None of the classical liberal arguments for 
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private property (self-ownership, natural law, first occupation, labour and - if one includes Kant, 
which Tomasi doesn’t - mutual self-respect) really does the work that would be required of it, if 
it were to offer a secure basis for present private property holdings.  To take just the most 
celebrated case, while there is plenty of diversity and disagreement in the vast Locke industry, 
almost no-one (with the possible exception of John A. Simmons and Murray Rothbard) holds 
that Locke’s account of  creating property through ‘mixing one’s labour’ works (Simmons, 1983; 
2001;  Rothbard, 1970; for a comprehensive survey of the Locke literature, see Pierson ,2013).    
It is important to see that giving up the classical and or libertarian account of natural right or 
self-ownership also problematizes the allocation of particular holdings of property – and all of 
the transactions that follow on from these.  (The most radical alternative is Kropotkin’s: all 
production is indivisibly social and so we cannot attribute an individual property claim to anyone; 
Kropotkin (1990[1892/1906]). 
 
This is where David Hume comes in.  The best argument for the existing property regime in the 
classical liberal tradition is Hume’s: it works.  Who can legitimately lay claim to be the owner of 
what had been an intellectual problem at least since the time of the Stoics.  It rumbled on as a 
dispute between princes and popes throughout the middle ages.  And from time to time 
dissidents (like the Franciscans of the fourteenth century) came back with the alarming answer: 
no-one.   Hume cut through all of this.  Property (like justice) is necessary, but it is an artifice.  
Society has adopted a system of private property ownership because it has been found to be the 
very best way in which to encourage both social peace and economic prosperity.  The origins of 
property are lost in the mists of time.  They were almost certainly the product of force and fraud.  
But, Hume says, that doesn’t matter.   What does matter is that it works (to deliver social stability 
and prosperity). (Hume (1998[1751]; 2000[1739/40]; for an extended commentary, see Pierson, 
2013) 
 
This was an elegant and, on the face of it, deeply conservative solution; (though it does throw 
overboard all previous arguments about the just origins of property, undermining virtually the 
entire libertarian tradition of arguments for private property).    But at the same time, it meant 
that property was artificial, it was a societal creation (not a natural right) and its justification was 
that it worked.  So long as one judged that it was working (whatever that meant), this was a 
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conservative position.  As soon as one judges that it is not working (again whatever that might 
mean), it is potentially deeply corrosive of the established property order.   
 
If we cast forward a generation to the classical utilitarians (and to Bentham rather than J.S. Mill), 
we can see that the Humean view is acutely vulnerable to an egalitarian reading.   
In an arrangement intended to give to every man the greatest possible amount of 
happiness, no reason can be assigned why the law should seek to give one man more 
than another.  
Given the logic of marginal utility, there is a presumption that the most good would be done (the 
greatest utility realised) by an equal distribution of property.   
Each portion of wealth is connected with a corresponding portion of happiness. 
..  The excess of happiness on the part of the most wealthy will not be so great as the 
excess of his wealth. 
.. The more nearly the actual proportion approaches to equality, the greater will be the 
total mass of  happiness. 
(Bentham, 1843, Part One, Chapters 6-8) 
Of course, in Bentham’s account, this assumption is immediately trumped by the claims of 
security.  Bentham seems at least as convinced as Hume that no-one should lay a finger on the 
present allocation of property (though this is itself entirely a creature of the man-made law), for 
fear that the slightest intervention would bring down the entire house of cards.  But, above all 
else, what justifies a regime of unequal property is the consequence it has in encouraging 
economic growth.   Security is important because it forms the necessary incentive basis for 
economic growth.   If it didn’t, it is not clear what would justify it.   If all of this were true, it 
follows that (the only defendable version of) the classical liberal argument for economic liberties 
is not their capacity to promote moral self-authorship but rather their capacity to put ‘a chicken in 
every pot and a car in every garage’.4  And whether that happens is an empirical question. 
 
                                                             
4 A phrase apparently mis-attributed to Herbert Hoover in the presidential campaign of 1928 
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This means (I think) that the ‘Great Fact’ of economic growth is actually crucial to Tomasi’s 
case.  Of course, there are questions (both domestically and globally) about who has created this 
wealth and what has been the role of government; (always a dead weight?).  Still, I think it would 
be insane to deny the transformation in people’s lives that have been made possible by the 
growth of Western capitalist economies over the past 250 years.   But what work should we 
understand the ‘great fact’ to do in justifying America’s current property regime?  The U.S. 
economy has doubled in size since 1980.  By contrast, the economy of the People’s Republic of 
China is about thirty-five times as large now as it was in 1980.5  Of course, some will argue that 
this just shows what a good dose of ‘capitalism’ can do in even the most unpromising of 
circumstances.    But it might also make us want to pause before moving too quickly from the 
fact of rapid economic growth to the justification of a society’s basic structure.   
 
In any case, for the moment, I want to concentrate on two other questions that are raised by 
Tomasi’s celebration of the American economy: distribution and timing.  While Tomasi observes 
that there has been an eightfold growth in the average income of Americans since 1900, he does 
not say anything about the (changing) distribution of this enormous growth.   In part, this may 
be because (unlike ‘mainstream’ Rawlsians), he does not see inequality (even very pronounced 
inequality) as a problem in itself.   And the absolute standard of living for those at the bottom of 
the pile undoubtedly grew through most of the twentieth century.  (Who in the bottom quintile 
could afford to go to Macdonalds and own a mobile phone in 1900?) 
 
There are hints of this concern in Tomasi’s account.  He does not, he insists, subscribe to the 
view that a rising tide lifts all boats or that wealth will ‘trickle down’; (how could he?)  But he 
does insist that the ‘new economy’ (heavy on services and self-employment) means more 
opportunities and that (somehow) unemployment is not quite what is used to be.   (In contrast 
to the last great recession, he suggests, unemployment now may mean not being able to send 
your kids to summer camp; Tomasi, 2012, 58).   Tomasi celebrates the emergence of a new more 
flexible, more creative, more person-focused workplace.  He even suggests that, after the 
dehumanizing experience of classical (industrial) capitalist growth, ‘the personalized economy 
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reverts to the long-term Western trend of advancing wealth and freedom together’; (the 
quotation is taken from Koch and Smith, 2007, 106). 
 
This is surely an empirical claim – and, in so far as it is, it just doesn’t seem right.  While labour 
processes will undoubtedly have become more flexible for many, this does not always represent 
an advance in human freedom.  (Think of the technologies of supervision in the average call 
centre or the fact that the smart phone means that the office is always with you!)    Flexibility 
often means working irregular hours for low wages.  No-one working in a university could 
possibly imagine that the last thirty years have seen a growth in autonomy for academic workers. 
And, while much discussed, the growth of self-employment just seems not to have happened. As 
a proportion of the workforce, self-employment has been falling since the 1960s and has flat-
lined since 2000; (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: w.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2010/09/art2full.pdf ). 
 
Once we turn to the data on distribution and changes across time, the unanswerable case for 
American capitalism as a model of free market fairness looks even less compelling.  If we think of 
the past thirty years as broadly deregulating – a period in which individual economic liberties 
have been enhanced through the process of de-unionization and an assault on established 
welfare rights -  we find that distributional outcomes have become more unequal; indeed, much 
more unequal.    Since the mid-1970s the proportion of pre-tax income going to the top 1% of 
earners in the U.S. has increased from around 9% to around 24%.  Average hourly wages rose 
steadily throughout the twentieth century until 1970, since when they have almost flat-lined.  In 
the same period, real family income has risen for the top 5% by 70%, while for the bottom 20% 
it has fallen by more than 7% (in real terms).  (See Charts 1-3 below).     
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Of course, for those who think that even extreme inequality is unimportant these numbers may 
not seem consequential – but the rest of us will be looking closely to see just how great are the 
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gains which entrenching economic liberties as basic liberties might be expected to bring us, 
especially in terms of delivering ‘fairness’. 
 
Here, the evidence is underwhelming.   Tomasi’s illustrations of the case for a protected range of 
‘economic liberties’ tend to be very homely and anecdotal - like his celebration of the start-up 
small business, Amy’s Pup-in-a-Tub, or the middle income family choosing to have packed 
lunches all week so that they can afford to take in a movie at the weekend (66, 79).   But the 
truth is that these examples have almost nothing to do with the ownership of productive capital.  
The principal beneficiary of such an entrenchment would not be a class of start-up entrepreneurs 
or hungry movie-goers but corporate capital, and finance capital above all.  Nor is it clear that 
undermining collective provision or the regulation of labour contracts will make those affected 
‘less free’.  (This was, in essence, the argument of mine-owners and factory owners in the early 
nineteenth century,,famously endorsed by Herbert Spencer; Spencer, (1994a[1884]).   Or think of 
the contrast that Tomasi draws between the ‘freed-up’ workers in the U.S. and workers living in 
the doll’s houses of European welfare states (113).  Europe’s workers, as he describes them, are 
secure and may be comfortable – but they lack the capacity and opportunity for self-direction.   
As it happens, I think this is a largely fictional account of Europe’s welfare states past and 
(especially) present.   But, for now, it is another point that I have in mind.   Are we to believe 
that Swedish workers – with high levels of unionization, free tertiary education,  good public 
services, adequate pensions  and high taxes - are really less ‘free’ – that is lack a capacity for self-
direction or ‘moral self-authorship’ – compared to insecure, non-unionised, casual workers with 
no pension entitlement and no health care, working in the U.S.?  To take another example, 
should we look upon the decline in statutory occupational pension entitlements for workers in 
the U.K. (and elsewhere) as an advance in their freedom: leaving them ‘free to choose’? 
 
I have managed to get this far without mentioning the bankers.  Nonetheless, it does seem like 
an extraordinary time to come forward with an argument that greater ‘capitalist economic 
liberties’ will enhance societal fairness.   In the years down to 2008, a number of rapaciously 
greedy (and already wealthy) people came close to driving the great juggernaut of western 
capitalism over the cliff.  They (and it) were only saved by a colossal injection of taxpayers’ 
money.  The suggestion that  one of the benefits of private ownership is that it has made of 
successful investment bankers ‘diligent researchers, creative analysts, and fiercely independent 
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(“contrarian”) thinkers’ would be funny if Tomasi didn’t mean it (79). For the most part, they are 
still there but many of the small players, from Amy’s Pup-in-a-Tub to beachside cafes on the 
Greek islands - not to mention the core fabric of Europe’s welfare states - are definitely all gone.  
The cost is being borne every day by ordinary taxpayers: workers, would-be workers, pensioners 
and small businesses across the Western world and beyond (see Otker-Robe and Podpiera, 
2013).  Many people would like to change this architecture – but they can’t, not because the 
‘economic liberties’ of the key players are too weak but because they are too strong: too big to 
fail and too big to bail (Blyth, 2013). 
 
The existing property order is one that we have produced and reproduce on a daily basis.  I agree 
with Tomasi that it is good to see people controlling their own lives and making their own 
choices in work and in their economic lives more generally.  Whether we think this is best done 
by further entrenching ‘capitalist economic rights’ is, I think, in the end, an empirical question 
about which we can (and do) disagree.   The empirical question is this: would people be ‘freer’  
and would we have a market order which was more ‘fair’ if we had more entrenched ‘capitalist 
economic liberties’?    I think the answer is no.  The real problem as I see it is that the political 
prospects for the sort of alternative regimes that Rawls favoured look so bleak.  Given that, I am 
not sure what we can do.   But, as the first rule of being in an unwelcome hole is to stop digging, 
the very least we can do is to stop digging. 
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